Clive Robertson Caldwell was born on 28 July
1910. On the 103rd anniversary of his birth it is fitting to look back on the
aviation career of Australia’s highest scoring fighter pilot of the Second
World War.
Caldwell
was educated at Trinity and Sydney Grammar schools, leaving before he turned 17.
Pressured by his father, he joined the Bank of New South Wales. Caldwell and
the bank were not a good fit so he resigned. After a stint jackerooing up north
and a partnership in a private garage, he joined the MLC Assurance Company. As
a child, he had read of the exploits of British and German Great War aces: ‘like
most boys, I thought that this was the thing—how to be one such as they. I
could picture myself there, rolling through the clouds, shooting them down and
becoming a fighter ace!’ He joined the Royal Aero Club and by the time war
broke out had acquired a total of ten or eleven flying hours.
At 29, he
knew it was almost too late to be a fighter pilot so asked a friend who was a chemist
to professionally amend the date on his birth certificate. When he arrived at the
Royal Australian Air Force recruitment centre with the altered document he was challenged
about his age but Caldwell said it was not their place to cross-examine him. He
had been asked to produce a birth certificate, and he had. Two months later, he
was accepted by the RAAF as a cadet officer for pilot training but soon discovered
his course was destined to become instructors. He resigned and was accepted
into the Empire Air Training Scheme.
He carried
out all of his training in Australia and received his flying badge in November
1940. On 12 January 1941, he was granted his commission. He embarked for the
Middle East and, after a brief stint with 73 Squadron RAF, joined 250 Squadron
RAF on 8 May, just as it was converting to the Tomahawk IIB.
250 Squadron
was called upon to assist with the invasion of Syria. Caldwell’s first sortie was
on 12 May, escorting bombers to Palmyra airfield. There was no action in the
air but he carried out some ground strafing and set one enemy aircraft on fire,
and damaged another. Over the next few days, he carried out a number of sorties
in Syria and Cyprus and escort flights during the evacuation of Crete. On 11
June, the squadron received a signal to prepare to take part in Operation Battleaxe, the army campaign to relieve Tobruk.
Caldwell took
off at dawn on 18 June but had to land again with electrical trouble. He was in
the air again fifteen minutes later but the other Tomahawks were about sixty
miles ahead. This did not deter Caldwell:
I suddenly
came on two lorries. As I closed toward [them], the crews jumped out and dived
into the ditch at the roadside. I opened fire on the first truck at about 500
yards and then suddenly another chap popped out of the second truck. I...knocked
him off like a ninepin. He fairly leapt into the air and came down flat on his
back in the road! Well, I turned and gave the lorries another splash just to
fix [them] for sure, then put a burst across the three Jerries lying in plain
view in the ditch and so did them in. About ten miles further along, I found
five lorries all dispersed in a circle and had a go at them, putting three out
of action. In the meantime, they opened up with machine guns and a bit of
tracer was flying about. I had a stab at one gun post and silenced that, fixing
the two gunners and pushed off toward Tobruk.
Caldwell
eventually caught up with his detachment. On the way home, they were jumped by four
Me 109s. Caldwell engaged one without success. The Germans’ shooting was more
accurate and three Tomahawks were shot down, one in flames. Caldwell saw one of
the pilots bale out. As he floated down towards the sea, two Messerschmitts
dived on him. The first fired, but missed and zoomed away. A stream of bullets
from the second hit the helpless pilot as he swung in the cords of his
parachute. Then there was stillness. The body drifted down towards the sea. It
was recovered later, riddled with bullets. From that point, Caldwell had no
qualms about shooting down enemy parachutists.
Although
he was desperate to become one, Caldwell was not a natural fighter pilot and
once confessed it took about thirty sorties before he scored his first
air-to-air combat victory. He became frustrated by his lack of verified claims.
He eventually discovered an effective technique almost by accident:
I noticed
the shadows were quite clear there, running over the desert. It occurred to me that
if I could hit the shadow, I could hit the aircraft by simply transposing the
relative position. By firing at the shadow I could see the dust go up...So I
turned the guns on and my reflector sight on and opened fire on the shadow well
back, and found my...burst was over and behind it. I tried it again, just a
quick squirt on the trigger; you know, half a second burst. Same thing. By the
time I’d had about six of these one second bursts I found that I was beginning
to correct my shooting. And so quite obviously this was the answer.
Caldwell
demonstrated the technique to his commanding officer who was so impressed he
reported it to headquarters. A directive was soon sent to all desert fighter
squadrons to adopt shadow shooting.
On 25
June, a contingent of Tomahawks were returning home after a bomber escort when
the enemy fighters arrived:
Down they
came on us like bombs. In the first rush no one was hurt and they carried on
away down in their dive. As we got near Tobruk the [anti-aircraft fire] opened
up and we shifted away a bit, then they arrived in force and about forty
machines got going on us. I was sort of flopping about all over the sky trying
to get fixed and having a shot now and then as one flashed by. I got on one
chap’s tail and was just going along well when I heard a couple of sharp taps
and saw some holes appear in my wing and tracer slipping by just beside the
cockpit so I deduced that one must be on my tail and took plenty of violent action
to spook him off. When I recovered from the shock I was at about 9000 feet and
more or less unattached. Then just below me, out of the general ruck...an Me
109 quickly flew straight and level, so I winged over and dived on it. He saw
me and dived too, but I managed to close to about 150 feet and let him have the
lot. We raced on down, me firing like hell and as we got truly low, I began to pull
out and he just kept right on, hit the ground and exploded with a hell of a
flash.
Caldwell had finally achieved his first
acknowledged victory.
During his
training, Caldwell was taught the duty of killing: the prevailing doctrine was
that the fighter pilot’s job was to kill but the killer instinct can only be
acquired when the pilot enters combat. The quicker he acquires this, the better
his chances of surviving. Caldwell’s killer instinct was based on a sound
fighting philosophy: ‘use your head before your guns. Always attack. Always be
aggressive and determined. Never relax that attitude. Be decisive and quick’. His score quickly mounted and he
acquired the sobriquet ‘Killer’, a nickname he grew to despise.
On 29
August, ten Tomahawks were sent on a convoy patrol and encountered the enemy.
Caldwell was acting as weaver when he was sighted by two Me 109s, which
appeared almost simultaneously, one from astern and the other from his port
side. He saw neither as they launched their attack. His aircraft sustained much
damage. He
was hit in his left shoulder and hip and small pieces of glass embedded in his
face. The aircraft spun out of control and he blacked out
while pulling out of the dive. When he came to, he considered baling but the
fire died out. He decided to remain in his Tomahawk:
All of a
sudden streams of smoke started to go past me, two 109s were after me...I
thought, ‘Well, I’ve bought it this time definitely’. I did what I could, but a
bullet hit the wing again, and that didn’t help me very much, and I must have
been about a quarter of an hour with those blokes chasing me and skidding, and
me all the time trying to turn and watch them and the sweat just dripping out
of my helmet with fright and hard work. And then one of them did a silly thing.
He got a little bit over-confident, and when I turned once he just turned round
and overshot me, and I put a burst into his belly and he went into the sea. The
other chap let me go. It was just on dark, and he probably wanted to go home
and was out of ammunition.
With the
destruction of this Me 109, Caldwell had become an ‘ace’. He had five confirmed
victories, three half shares, six damaged, one probable and one unconfirmed. As
well as recognition as an ace, Caldwell’s efforts resulted in his being awarded
the Distinguished Flying Cross.
Caldwell continued to score air
victories with 250 Squadron, including the famous ‘Stuka party’ of 5 December
1941 when, in a firing spree that took about 18 seconds, he
accounted for five Stukas, and became an ace in a day. For this action, he was awarded the
bar to his Distinguished Flying Cross. On 28 December, he was
notified that he was to command 112 Squadron RAF, flying Kittyhawk Is. He
continued to notch up victories as he developed an aggressive leadership style
which also resulted in squadron success. During Caldwell’s period as commander,
112 Squadron accounted for eighteen and three shared destroyed enemy aircraft. He
was awarded the Polish Cross of Valour in appreciation of
his gallant co-operation with the Polish pilots of 112 Squadron.
When Caldwell left the Middle East in May 1942, his official score was 20½ enemy aircraft
destroyed: he had become the top-scoring desert fighter pilot.
After brief stints in
America and the UK, where he flew operations to France with the Kenley Wing in
order to familiarise himself with the Spitfire, Caldwell returned to Australia.
He was initially posted to 2 Operational Training Unit in Mildura as a flying
instructor and then carried out tests on the Boomerang. He took command of 1
Fighter Wing in November 1942.
1 Fighter Wing consisted of 54
Squadron RAF and 452 and 457 squadrons RAAF. Flying Spitfire Mark Vcs initially and later the Mark VIII, they were tasked with
the defence of Australia. The Wing arrived at Darwin in January 1943. Wing Commander
Caldwell was itching to get back into combat, and was looking forward to
leading the Wing against the Japanese. Since February 1942, fifty air raids had
been carried out over the Darwin area and it was reasonable to assume his
opportunity would come soon. However, the Japanese attack plan changed about
this time: they started carrying out heavy raids at intervals rather than small
but frequent attacks. This became a frustrating period for Caldwell but he made
the most of the few opportunities offered and led his Wing with dynamism and
skill. One defence, however, left him open to criticism at the highest levels.
At 9.26 a.m. on 2 May
1943, the Bathurst Island RDF station recorded the first plots of enemy
aircraft and almost immediately alerted fighter sector control. It was the 54th
Japanese raid over Australia. Thirty-three Spitfires were scrambled and 1
Spitfire Wing was ordered to rendezvous at 10,000 feet above Hughes strip.
After
rendezvous, the controller advised Caldwell that twenty-plus bombers, escorted
by a large number of fighters, was approaching from west-north-west at
approximately 20,000 feet, and confirmed Darwin as the target. When the Wing
was about ten miles north east of Darwin, at 26,000 feet, the enemy formation
was sighted passing West Point. The bombers crossed the harbour and Caldwell
saw the escorting fighters above the bombers. The Wing had attained 27,000 feet
by this stage but was still not in a position to attack advantageously so Caldwell
decided to continue climbing for height, letting the bombers continue on their
way. He would attack on their way out.
The Japanese
bombers were 26,000 feet above the RAAF aerodrome at Darwin when they commenced
bombing at 10.15 a.m. Their fighter escort was at 31,000 feet, but the Spitfire
Wing had attained only 30,000 feet. After bomb release, the Japanese turned
right. The Spitfire Wing levelled out at 32,500 feet. It had now attained its
maximum advantage and turned west, moving to intercept the enemy aircraft as
they crossed the coast on their way out. The Wing was in a sound formation,
with squadrons sections abreast, and the Wing in squadrons abreast. But then,
54 Squadron lost position and dropped astern. As the enemy crossed the coast
just east of Point Blaze, 452 and 457 squadrons were in an excellent position
to attack but, despite being ordered to by Caldwell, 54 Squadron did not close
the gap. It was some considerable distance behind and eight minutes elapsed
before it came into position. Once this happened, the attack commenced. 54
Squadron was instructed to attack the fighter cover, 457 was to attack the
bombers, and 452 were to follow 457, keeping their tails clear during their
attack on the bombers, engaging as many fighters as possible, and also covering
457’s withdrawal back up on the sunward side.
54 Squadron’s pilots
hurtled down at 400 miles per hour in an almost vertical dive and claimed one
damaged bomber, two destroyed fighters, one probable fighter and three damaged
fighters. Whilst 54 Squadron was diving to attack the fighters, 457 attacked
the bombers. The Japanese fighter escort turned to face 457 head-on,
successfully diverting their attack. Even so, 457 squadron destroyed one
fighter, probably destroyed one more and two were damaged.
After 457 Squadron
attacked, Caldwell led 452 Squadron into the battle. Diving steeply, he
attacked a Zero at close range. He had problems with his cannons, his aircraft
slewed starboard and he missed the Zero. He broke up sharply and was attacked
by two Zeros, one of which commenced firing. Caldwell dived under them, but
another came up behind him, and Pilot Officer Kenneth Fox fired on it until it
turned away. Fox then engaged another Zero, but his Spitfire was hit in the
engine and he baled out. Flying Officer Adrian Goldsmith destroyed a bomber but
was then attacked by a Hap. His controls were shot away and he too baled out.
Caldwell destroyed a Zero and a Hap, and the squadron claimed two probably
destroyed Zeros and a damaged Hap. The whole engagement lasted twenty minutes.
From a Japanese
perspective, the raid was a success. They claimed twenty-one shot down and four
probables. No losses were acknowledged. The fighters were successful in
protecting the bombers, and the bombers reached their target. Although major
damage was not done there was some nuisance value.
From the Wing’s
perspective, the engagement was not a success. Despite its advantage of sun,
height and speed, results were not up to expectations. Although it had
destroyed or damaged a number of fighters, the Wing only claimed one bomber
destroyed and one damaged. Two Spitfire pilots were killed and fourteen Spitfires
were destroyed or damaged—of which only three could be directly attributed to
enemy action. A number of factors impacted on the Wing’s success, including the
skill of the Japanese pilots, weaponry problems, the Spitfire’s lack of fuel
capacity, the tactics used and general lack of fighter combat experience in the
Wing.
1 Fighter Wing’s defence was
criticised by General MacArthur’s headquarters and General
Kenney. Media
reaction was harsh, and public confidence in the Spitfire defence was shaken. Shortly
after, the Advisory War Council requested Air Vice-Marshal George Jones, Chief
of Air Staff, to make a full report of the action. His report failed to acknowledge
long term Spitfire maintenance problems and that Caldwell’s battle strategy had
been predetermined. He also appeared to pay more attention to erroneous media
reports than to post-battle debriefs. He ignored the fact that Caldwell had
warned his pilots on a number of occasions to keep an eye on their fuel
consumption and was critical of Caldwell’s leadership.
Caldwell replied to
Jones’ criticism of his actions by claiming his pilots had been properly
directed during the engagements, and if they had obeyed their instructions,
they would have reached base safely. It
also angered him that Jones did not directly consult him about the
Wing’s defence. Throughout his life, Caldwell maintained his anger over the
treatment of the Wing after Raid 54. He later stated: ‘I regret to say that our
own Chief of Air Staff, without bothering to check the facts…abandoned us. And
we were disgusted.’
A number of changes were
made as a consequence of Raid 54, including the use of belly tanks on Spitfires.
In addition, the dogfight was largely abandoned in favour of the dive-pass
attack method, with emphasis on attacking only with the advantage of height.
The Wing quickly assimilated the new tactics and effected a successful defence on
20 June. Caldwell shot down his fifth enemy aircraft over Darwin and
was awarded the Distinguished
Service Order shortly after. With an official score of 25½ victories this Japanese victory saw Caldwell become
an ace five times over and an ace in two different theatres of war. This was a
unique achievement for an Australian pilot.
Caldwell
scored two more victories against the Japanese, taking his official score to 27½. He was posted to 2
Operational Training Unit as Chief Flying Instructor in September 1943. Towards
the end of the war, having attained the rank of Group Captain, he commanded
80 Fighter Wing, was involved in the so-called ‘Morotai Mutiny’ and was
court-martialled for liquor trading. After the war, he went into
import/export and established a successful business career.
Caldwell died peacefully on 5 August 1994 after a long
illness. He had been proud of his wartime achievements and did not regret any of
his actions. Those who
loved and respected him recalled a courageous and dedicated leader who had been
acclaimed by Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur
Tedder as ‘an excellent leader and a first class shot’. Despite the controversial aspects of the latter
stage of his air force career, Caldwell was deeply committed to a
concept of duty and believed it was his responsibility to help defeat the
enemy. However, he did not wear the strictures of the RAAF well and was often
at odds with elements of the air force hierarchy. Even so, he had accomplished
much. His innovative
skills led to his discovery of shadow shooting, which he considered to be his
most important contribution to the war in the air. He was the
first Australian empire air scheme trainee to become a flight commander. He was
the first to command a squadron and was also the first graduate to rise to the
rank of group captain. He
had been officially attributed with 27½ victories and was Australia’s highest scoring fighter pilot of the
Second World War. With his remarkable war time achievements, Clive Caldwell
holds an important place in many hearts and in Australia’s war time history.
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